SPECIAL EDITION 1 · NOVEMBER 2026 SPECIAL EDITION DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY

FIRMAMENT

The Magazine for Decision-Makers in Business, Industry and Government

A JOINT EDITION OF THE DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL (DC)
AND THE CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CSM), WARSAW




DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY

Europe's freedom *to decide*

Chips, cloud, algorithms and AI: who controls the technologies on which Europe's prosperity, security and democracy rest? Exclusive excerpts from the new book "Digital Sovereignty for Europe".


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Tomasz Klekowski
THINKTANK LEADERS HUB
The day the digital world went quiet



Dr. Alina Bârgăoanu
MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL
The war for influence



Jochen M. Richter
CHAIR, DC GLOBAL SECURITY FORUM
Three powers, three models

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A CO-EDITION

This Special Edition is published jointly by the Diplomatic Council (DC) and the Centre for International Relations (CSM), Warsaw – the two partners behind the book "Digital Sovereignty for Europe".

CENTRUM STOSUNKÓW MIĘDZYNARODOWYCH
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Diplomatic Council
The Global Think Tank
DC

ALL EXCERPTS

Every article in this edition is a verbatim excerpt from the book. Headlines, introductions and captions were written by the editors. Omissions are marked [...]; footnotes have been left out.

EDITORIAL

Europe's freedom *to decide*

This Special Edition of FIRMAMENT is a first in two respects. It is our first issue in English, and it is a co-edition: the Diplomatic Council (DC) and the Centre for International Relations (CSM), Warsaw, publish it together – just as they jointly published the book on which it draws, "Digital Sovereignty for Europe – Power, Technology and the Freedom to Decide".

The pages that follow let the three authors speak for themselves. Every excerpt is quoted word for word from the book. We have chosen passages that open the argument rather than settle it. Think of this edition as a taste, not the full meal.

Tomasz Klekowski, Partner at ThinkTank Leaders Hub, once led marketing and market development for Intel across Europe, the Middle East and Africa. He takes the reader down the technology stack, from semiconductors to the AI ecosystem, and asks where Europe's dependencies hurt most.

Dr. Alina Bârgăoanu, Dean of the College of Communication and Public Relations at SNSPA in Bucharest, is a member of the Diplomatic Council. She turns to the information space, where algorithms, data and amplification have become instruments of power.

Jochen M. Richter, who edited the book, is an Executive Member of the Diplomatic Council and chairs its Global Security Forum. A former Director at the European Parliament, he sets Europe's model alongside those of the United States and China.

The three chapters reflect their authors' personal views, and they do not always agree. That is deliberate. In the words of the book's introduction: "Digital sovereignty is not a settled doctrine but an open argument." We hope this edition invites you to join it.

PO POLSKU

Europa i jej wolność decydowania

To specjalne wydanie FIRMAMENTU jest pod dwoma względami pierwsze. To nasz pierwszy numer w języku angielskim, a zarazem wydanie wspólne: Diplomatic Council (DC) i Centrum Stosunków Międzynarodowych (CSM) w Warszawie publikują je razem – tak jak wspólnie wydały książkę, z której czerpie: „Digital Sovereignty for Europe – Power, Technology and the Freedom to Decide".

Na kolejnych stronach głos oddajemy samym autorom. Każdy fragment przytaczamy dosłownie za książką. Wybraliśmy te, które otwierają dyskusję, a nie ją zamykają. To raczej przedsmak niż pełne danie.

Tomasz Klekowski, partner w ThinkTank Leaders Hub, kierował niegdyś marketingiem i rozwojem rynku Intela w Europie, na Bliskim Wschodzie i w Afryce. Prowadzi czytelnika przez kolejne warstwy technologii – od półprzewodników po ekosystem AI – i pyta, gdzie zależności Europy bolą najbardziej.

Dr Alina Bârgăoanu, dziekan Wydziału Komunikacji i Public Relations SNSPA w Bukareszcie, jest członkinią Diplomatic Council. Przygląda się przestrzeni informacyjnej, w której algorytmy, dane i mechanizmy zwiększania zasięgu stały się narzędziami władzy.

Jochen M. Richter, redaktor książki, jest członkiem władz (Executive Member) Diplomatic Council i przewodniczy jego Global Security Forum. Jako były dyrektor w Parlamencie Europejskim zestawia model europejski z modelami Stanów Zjednoczonych i Chin.

Trzy rozdziały odzwierciedlają osobiste poglądy autorów, którzy nie zawsze się ze sobą zgadzają. I właśnie o to chodzi. Jak czytamy we wstępie do książki: „Digital sovereignty is not a settled doctrine but an open argument" – suwerenność cyfrowa nie jest zamkniętą doktryną, lecz otwartym sporem. Mamy nadzieję, że to wydanie zachęci Państwa do włączenia się w ten spór.

Dlaczego po angielsku? Pozostała część magazynu ukazuje się w języku angielskim, ponieważ również książka „Digital Sovereignty for Europe" została wydana po angielsku.
The rest of this magazine is in English, as is the book on which it draws.

The Editors · Redakcja

FIRMAMENT SPECIAL EDITION · DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL (DC) AND CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CSM), WARSAW

INTRODUCTION



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DAYS

The day the *switch* was flipped

In June 2026, Europe learned how quickly a technological dependency can become a political one. The book's editor opens with an episode that made the point impossible to miss.

INTRODUCTION

“Nineteen days is a short interruption”

BY **JOCHEN M. RICHTER**, EDITOR

On 12 June 2026, European companies, researchers and public institutions learned how quickly a technological dependency can become a political one. Following export controls imposed by the US Department of Commerce, Anthropic suspended access to its newest AI models, Claude Fable 5 and Claude Mythos 5, only three days after their release. The controls were lifted on 30 June, and access returned the next day. Nineteen days is a short interruption. Yet it made a point that years of policy papers had struggled to land: capabilities on which Europe’s economy, administrations and research increasingly rely can be switched off by a decision taken in Washington, with no European say in the matter.

The episode did not create Europe’s dependencies; it made them visible. Over decades, Europe has built its digital life on chips designed in the United States and manufactured in Taiwan, and on cloud platforms run by American hyperscalers. Its social media run on algorithms written elsewhere, and its newest AI models are trained beyond its borders. For most of that time, this looked like efficient globalisation. Today it raises a harder question: how much control does Europe need over the technologies on which its prosperity, security and democracy rest, and what is it prepared to pay for it?

This book approaches that question from three angles. […]

The three chapters reflect the personal views and assessments of their respective authors. They overlap in places and differ in others: on how far Europe should go, how fast, and at what cost. These differences have been deliberately preserved. Digital sovereignty is not a settled doctrine but an open argument. Europe will be better served by a debate that is informed, candid and plural than by any single prescription.

“Digital sovereignty is not a settled doctrine but an open argument.”

JOCHEN M. RICHTER

Excerpt from the Introduction to “Digital Sovereignty for Europe”



Tomasz Klekowski, Partner at ThinkTank Leaders Hub

TECHNOLOGY

The day the digital world *went quiet*

One reporter, 72 hours, no American technology: Tomasz Klekowski on what a small experiment reveals about Europe's big dependency.

BY **TOMASZ KLEKOWSKI**

A few days ago I came across an article by Mathieu Pollet, "Flipping the kill switch: I survived 72 hours without US tech". The reporter decided to disconnect himself from every device and service based on American technology in an attempt to understand the level of European dependence on American digital technology. He lived for 72 hours without an iPhone or Mac, without Google Search or Maps, and without Slack, Teams, WhatsApp, Signal, ChatGPT, streaming platforms or card payments.

The experiment began as a personal response to a much larger European anxiety. What would happen if Washington turned Europe's dependence on Silicon Valley into political leverage? The scenario was fictional, but its foundations were not. Recent restrictions on access to financial and advanced technological services had already shown that digital access can be limited by decisions taken far beyond the user's control. A survey cited in the article found that 74 percent of European business leaders feared that such a disruption could affect their operations.

At the individual level, the consequences appeared almost comic. Without notifications, the reporter experienced unease and FOMO; without Google Maps, ordinary shopping required planning; without Visa or Mastercard, cash returned to daily life. European alternatives existed but often remained difficult to use because the surrounding ecosystem – devices, operating systems, app stores, payments and cloud infrastructure – was still controlled by American companies.

Work proved more revealing than leisure. Linux, Proton, Vivaldi, Qwant, LibreOffice and Mistral made it technically possible to continue. The real obstacle was collaboration. Meetings, documents and constant informal exchanges depended on platforms shared by colleagues. "It was as if you had disappeared," one of Mathieu's colleagues remarked. The problem was not the absence of a European substitute; it was the absence of a common European environment in which everyone could participate.

In fact, the reporter described his dependence on the devices and services he used directly. If we looked deeper into infrastructure and computer and network hardware, we would come to even more alarming conclusions, as computers and servers, CPUs, GPUs and networking chips are almost exclusively designed by American companies and often produced outside Europe, for example in Taiwan.

After three days, the reporter returned to the familiar ecosystem. Yet the experiment left a lasting question. Europe's vulnerability is not simply that its citizens use foreign products. It is that communication, authentication, payments, knowledge and business continuity have been placed inside a small number of external digital systems, designed, produced and controlled abroad. Digital sovereignty therefore cannot be achieved by isolated consumer choices. It requires shared capabilities, interoperable alternatives and the collective ability to keep Europe functioning when convenience is no longer guaranteed.

THE EXPERIMENT

72

hours without any device or service based on American technology

74 %

of European business leaders feared that such a disruption could affect their operations, according to a survey cited in the article


"Digital sovereignty therefore cannot be achieved by isolated consumer choices."

TOMASZ KLEKOWSKI

Excerpt from the chapter "Towards Digital Sovereignty" in "Digital Sovereignty for Europe"

THE TECHNOLOGY STACK

Layer by layer, *dependency* by dependency



The layers of the technology stack examined in the chapter “Towards Digital Sovereignty”

$728 bn
value of the semiconductor market in 2025, as estimated by World Semiconductor Trade Statistics

≈ 70 %
of total chip production capacity is located in South Korea, Taiwan and China

€400 bn
spent annually by EU enterprises on cloud services and software

83 %
of this sum flows to U.S. firms

Figures as cited in the book: semiconductor data from World Semiconductor Trade Statistics and market analysts; cloud data from a report by the Polish Economic Institute (PIE), May 2025.

TECHNOLOGY

“A multilayered technology stack”

BY **TOMASZ KLEKOWSKI**

This does not mean pursuing the illusion of complete autarky, which is unrealistic under contemporary conditions of globalisation. It means finding a point of balance that enables Europe to protect its interests, preserve its agency and continue benefiting from international networks of interdependence, while taking the emerging geopolitical environment into account.

[...]

Digitalisation is increasingly penetrating every sphere of the economy, from business processes in small and medium-sized enterprises to the operation of entire strategic sectors. As this process advances, dependence on digital technologies grows, as does the complexity of the relationships concealed behind them. Every application, infrastructure solution and cloud system is not a single product but a multilayered technology stack, in which decisions taken at one layer can determine security and independence at other levels. Decision-makers, however, often focus on the final solution provider while overlooking hidden dependencies that extend from the origin of components and the location of data to the political circumstances shaping manufacturers and suppliers.

[...]

In a world where globalisation is giving way to regionalisation, informed technology choices require a thorough analysis of entire ecosystems. This analysis must cover everything from supplier concentration and licensing fees to the location of factories and dependencies on states whose strategic interests may differ from Europe’s.

THE MOONSHOT

In June 2026 Anton Leicht, a writer and fellow with the Technology and International Affairs program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, published an article outlining what it would take to break away from technology dependence on the United States and China and build sovereign AI. [...] He calls for the creation of a coalition of countries extending beyond the EU and believes that Canada, Australia, South Korea and Japan should be part of it. He calls this group a coalition of middle powers.

- The Budget and Capital: A necessary, massive commitment of $500 billion over four years funded by the participating governments.
- Talent Acquisition: A specialised $65 billion budget dedicated exclusively to poaching top-tier global researchers and developing advanced AI agents.

He leaves us with the question of whether Europeans are brave enough to regain autonomy.

Excerpts from the chapter “Towards Digital Sovereignty” in “Digital Sovereignty for Europe”

The war for *influence*

Disinformation is less about false content than about algorithms, data and amplification. Dr. Alina Bârgăoanu on technological sovereignty as a question of power.



Dr. Alina Bârgăoanu, Professor and Dean of the College of Communication and Public Relations, SNSPA Bucharest

MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL

"She is currently a member of the Diplomatic Council" – from the author's biography in the book

BY **DR. ALINA BÂRGĂOANU**

The contemporary global environment is undergoing a profound transformation, in which competition is no longer limited to territory, military capabilities, financial or economic resources, but extends to control over the information and communication ecosystem and to the data and technological infrastructure underlying it, and to the capacity to build and protect this technological infrastructure – i.e. technological sovereignty. Hybrid threats are part of the geopolitical influence war happening at the same time as other wars, such as the trade or the technological war.

In this context, the urgency for the EU to develop its technological sovereignty is twofold. First, it stems from concern over the outstanding advances of the US and China in terms of digital capacities and technological infrastructures. As I argue in this chapter, however, this is not merely a question of economic growth driven by the latest technological revolution. Control over digital resources – including social media platforms, artificial intelligence, data, algorithms and computational resources – increasingly shapes the unfolding geopolitical competition. It affects which actors can exercise influence over contemporary public spaces, which countries are pushed into a state of techno-dependency, and whose strategic public conversations are ultimately shaped by external actors.

The second reason for concern is related to regulation and control over the infrastructural core of the digital society. The aforementioned systems are largely controlled by private companies whose economic strength, technological capacities and global reach give them major influence over information and people's attention, with proprietary algorithms determining which content is visible, what is recommended, or what is neglected. As a result, tech companies, such as Meta (Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Threads), Alphabet (YouTube, Google), TikTok or X, no longer function as mere intermediaries; they raise a broader issue of political power and control over infrastructures of public opinion formation and public communication. Arguably, the largest digital platforms owned by tech companies undertake two structural functions that are indispensable to contemporary societies. On the one hand, they act as the main gateways for access to audiences, data, technology, and con- tent, thus determining the conditions of access to markets and key demographics. On the other hand, they play a public function as well, actively shaping people's social and economic opportunities and, in turn, influencing how they can exercise their fundamental rights, freedoms, and interests [...]

These dynamics shift the nature of the regulatory, oversight and governance problem. The concentration of the data and technological infrastructure underlying the digital information ecosystem within the US and China (with due differences and nuances), combined with the increasing capacity for these states to leverage platform power to reach geopolitical and economic objectives, directly affects the EU's security and interests. Technological over-dependence is increasingly becoming a geopolitical issue since many infrastructures central to national security and democratic life are controlled by private companies. The European Union, with its regulatory and economic power, entered this competition from a particularly vulnerable position by exercising limited control over many of the infrastructures, platforms, and technological capabilities on which its own information environment increasingly depends.

"Technological over-dependence is increasingly becoming a geopolitical issue."

DR. ALINA BÂRGĂOANU

Excerpt from the chapter "Technological Sovereignty" in "Digital Sovereignty for Europe"

THE LEVERS OF INFLUENCE



Who controls the infrastructure *controls the conversation*

Traditional military capabilities remain important but no longer provide a complete measure of strategic capacity because societies depend increasingly on technological systems that governments may not own or not even shape. In this perspective, information and the infrastructure on which it flows are instruments for influencing cognition, with the human mind itself increasingly becoming an object of strategic competition. Digital technologies have expanded the scale at which such influence can operate, and social media platforms, the online information ecosystem and artificial intelligence now actively mediate and shape access to information. Algorithms are central to this structural problem, as recommender systems select, rank and distribute information. In other terms, content visibility and mediation are taken over by opaque computational processes. In this sense, the current struggle over information (content, mediation, infrastructure) is simultaneously a struggle over technological capacity: actors that control the infrastructure of the information environment acquire not only economic advantages, but also a significant capacity to determine how information circulates, what surfaces and what is suppressed, who can access it, and under what circumstances influence can be exercised.

Excerpt from the chapter "Technological Sovereignty" in "Digital Sovereignty for Europe"

INFORMATION SPACE

“More speech is needed”

For the EU, regulation cannot substitute for vision, calibrated clarity, capacity and coordination, given that technological systems have become, and may increasingly become, subject to commercial decisions and economic leverage, changes in political priorities, extraterritorial legislation, supply disruptions or geopolitical pressure. The same reasoning applies to the governance of the digital environment shaping public opinion and public will. The European Union should continue to establish enforceable standards for platforms operating within its jurisdiction, particularly regarding transparency, algorithmic accountability, political advertising, access to data and systemic risks.

However, the long-term objective should extend beyond determining the terms under which non-European infrastructures operate. The European Union should also develop technological instruments of its own.

[...]

While being aware of the errors and missteps of previous efforts meant to tackle disinformation, I truly believe that countering disinformation and hostile influence versus preserving freedom of speech is largely an artificial trade-off. In a vibrant democracy, more speech is needed, more freely circulating speech reaching larger and ever more vulnerable audiences, more speech keeping power accountable, and more speech pressuring and incentivising decision-makers to inform, explain, convince, build and maintain social cohesion.

DEMOCRATIC TECHNOLOGICAL SOVEREIGNTY

Democratic technological sovereignty means data defence and defence of visibility engineering mechanisms; it requires institutional safeguards, transparency, pluralism and protection of fundamental rights, including – or especially – freedom of expression and freedom of speech.

“Countering disinformation and hostile influence versus preserving freedom of speech is largely an artificial trade-off.”

DR. ALINA BÂRGĂOANU

Excerpt from the chapter “Technological Sovereignty” in “Digital Sovereignty for Europe”



Jochen M. Richter, Chair of the Diplomatic Council Global Security Forum, former Director at the European Parliament

COMPARISON

Three powers, *three models*

Rules, markets or the state: Jochen M. Richter compares how Europe, the United States and China understand digital sovereignty.

DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL

"As an Executive Member of the think tank Diplomatic Council (UN-registered), he chairs its Global Security Forum." – from the author's biography in the book

BY **JOCHEN M. RICHTER**

This chapter aims to provide a comprehensive overview of Europe's goals in both the economic and the regulatory dimension, compared with those of the US and China, concluding with an outlook.

The European Union's approach to digital sovereignty is economically grounded in the principle of "strategic autonomy." Therefore, the EU frames digital sovereignty as the capacity to independently develop, deploy, and govern critical digital technologies and infrastructure. This economic paradigm seeks to reduce structural dependencies on non-EU providers, particularly in cloud computing, semiconductors, and artificial intelligence, while leveraging the bloc's single market to foster a competitive, innovative, and resilient digital economy. The EU's strategy has evolved from a primarily regulatory stance to a more proactive industrial and investment-led model, recognising that legal frameworks alone cannot secure long-term economic competitiveness.

EUROPE · UNITED STATES · CHINA

Europe

"STRATEGIC AUTONOMY"

Europe's push for digital sovereignty has evolved from a niche policy debate into a comprehensive economic, industrial, and governance strategy. No longer merely a regulatory buzzword, it represents a systemic effort to break free from profound technological dependencies and secure a competitive foothold in the global digital race. Unlike the United States' market-driven approach, which leverages massive private capital and network effects, or China's state-centric model, which prioritises autarky and strategic control, the European Union frames digital sovereignty through the lens of "strategic autonomy." This paradigm seeks to independently develop, deploy, and govern critical digital technologies while steadfastly upholding fundamental rights, democratic oversight, and sustainable innovation.

United States

MARKET LIBERALISM MEETS STRATEGIC INTERVENTION

Unlike Europe's rights-centric paradigm or China's state-driven framework, the United States approaches digital sovereignty through a pragmatic blend of liberal market principles and selective state intervention. [...] Rather than enforcing strict territorial control or data localisation, Washington frames sovereignty as the imperative to dominate critical digital industries, fortify strategic supply chains, and shape global technical standards while sustaining a competitive domestic market. The evolution of this policy marks a fundamental transition in Washington's strategic mindset. For decades, the US government maintained a largely hands-off approach, operating under the assumption that global market forces and private enterprise would naturally perpetuate American technological leadership. However, as strategic competitors leveraged state capitalism and forced technology transfers to close the innovation gap, US policymakers realised that pure market dynamics were no longer sufficient to guarantee technological supremacy.

China

"THE SOVEREIGN WEB"

In the high-stakes arena of global technology, a new kind of border is being drawn. It is not made of concrete or wire, but of firewalls, data localisation mandates, and algorithmic oversight. At the centre of this transformation is China, a nation that views cyberspace not as a boundless frontier for free-market expansion, but as a critical extension of national territory. [...] Beijing has forged a radically different path: a state-centric framework of "digital sovereignty" that prioritises national security, regulatory autonomy, and strategic economic control.

"Sovereignty will not be achieved by building walls, but by cultivating the strategic autonomy to navigate a fractured digital world on Europe's own terms."

JOCHEN M. RICHTER

Excerpts from the chapter "Digital Sovereignty – A Comparative Examination" in "Digital Sovereignty for Europe"

COMPARISON

“A painful but necessary awakening”

BY **JOCHEN M. RICHTER**

The debate over European digital sovereignty has moved rapidly from academic theory and policy white papers to the centre stage of geopolitical survival. Once a niche concern for tech lobbyists and privacy advocates, sovereignty is now the defining struggle of the continent’s future. Sparked by a series of geopolitical shocks – most notably sudden US export controls blocking access to frontier AI models and the weaponisation of cloud infrastructure – Europe finds itself at a crossroads. The question is no longer whether Europe needs digital autonomy, but how to build it in a world where technological dependence is increasingly treated as a national security vulnerability.

[…]

The current status of the debate on European digital sovereignty is defined by a painful but necessary awakening. Europe has moved past the comfortable illusion of tech interdependence and is now confronting the hard realities of supply chain vulnerabilities, capital shortfalls, and geopolitical rivalry. […]

FROM THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOOK

The three chapters of this book look at digital sovereignty from different angles, yet they arrive at a common diagnosis. Europe does not lack talent, ideas or rules. It lacks scale, and that scale is lost to fragmentation. […]

No single Member State can change that equation, not even the largest. […]

“It buys a faster car while someone else keeps the keys.”

FROM THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE BOOK

Excerpts from “Digital Sovereignty – A Comparative Examination” and the Conclusions of “Digital Sovereignty for Europe”

CONCLUSIONS



From twenty-seven strategies *to one*

"Digital sovereignty will not come from walls, from regulation alone or from photo opportunities with tech executives. It will come from the willingness of Europeans to act together, accept the costs and think in decades rather than electoral cycles."

FROM THE CONCLUSIONS OF "DIGITAL SOVEREIGNTY FOR EUROPE"

THE AUTHORS

About the *authors*



Dr. Alina Bârgăoanu

MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL

Dr. Alina Bârgăoanu is a Romanian communication scholar serving as the Dean of the College of Communication and Public Relations, National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (Bucharest). She is currently a member of the Diplomatic Council and a researcher affiliated with the "Hybrid Threats, including Disinformation" research unit of Swedish Agency for Peace, Security and Development. [...] her main interests revolve around topics such as influence operations, cognitive warfare and cognitive resilience, the interplay between technology, democracy and the information ecosystem.



Tomasz Klekowski

PARTNER AT THINKTANK LEADERS HUB

Tomasz Klekowski is an executive advisor for digital transformation, author of market reports and international speaker. He focuses on exploring the impact of technology on organisations, the economy and society – working closely with corporate boards, industry organisations, governments and universities. [...] During his corporate career, Tomasz led marketing and market development for Intel Corporation across the Europe, Middle East and Africa (EMEA) region, having previously led Intel's operations in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).



Jochen M. Richter

EXECUTIVE MEMBER OF THE DIPLOMATIC COUNCIL

He began his career in public administration in Germany but soon became involved in IT. In February 1990, about three months after the fall of the Berlin Wall, he joined the European institutions, where he worked for the next 30 years in both the Commission and the Parliament. In addition to positions in research, competition, the internal market and conciliation, he served two Commissioners in their private offices (cabinets): Commissioner Frits Bolkestein (as a member of his cabinet) and Commissioner Leonard Orban (as Deputy Head of Cabinet). He retired as a Director of the European Parliament at the end of 2020. [...] As an Executive Member of the think tank Diplomatic Council (UN-registered), he chairs its Global Security Forum.

Biographies quoted from "Digital Sovereignty for Europe"



THE BOOK

Digital Sovereignty for Europe

Power, Technology and the Freedom to Decide

Alina Bârgăoanu
Tomasz Kłękowski
Jochen M. Richter
Edited by Jochen M. Richter

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CO-EDITION

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