Keynote address by Prof. Dr. Heinrich Kreft, Ambassador (ret), President of the Diplomatic Council, at the think tank’s New Year's Reception on February 5, 2025, for the presentation of the new book "Europe and the Emerging New Global Order":

„Let's start to look at only the last four years. What has happened since 2020, when Joe Biden took office at the end of January 2020, and what has already happened a few months after he took office? The most consequential event in my eyes was the abrupt withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan. This happened at the end of August, and you certainly remember the photos of the chaotic situation at the airport in Kabul. It marked the beginning of a chain of events: the Russian invasion of Ukraine, unprecedented pressure from China on Taiwan in the following years, the Hamas attack on Israel, and the chain of actions and reactions that followed because of these actions.

In parallel, we had the once familiar East-West relationship hardening, and major emerging powers like Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and many more have grown. Europe's weight in the world has weakened. The role of international governance bodies like the UN Security Council and the World Trade Organization has eroded, and more generally, international law is constantly challenged. This has been crowned, as you mentioned, by Trump's return to the White House. It's the last four years that have put the world upside down. The world is in transition, moving towards a new global order. That's the topic of our book. Times of transition are often times of uncertainties, times of disorder. I promise to do my utmost to counter any defeatism that might come up.

In our book we call on Europe to prepare better for the rapidly changing global environment. Europe has to embrace strategic autonomy in as many fields as possible. With the hindsight and the modesty of an observer, I will offer an assessment of strategic challenges for Europe in 2025, in order of decreasing importance:

1. Ukraine: We have a young Ukrainian among us here tonight. Ukraine is number one.
2. Trump's America: Number two.
3. Europe: Number three.
4. The Middle East: Number four.
5. The Global South: Number five.

Challenge number one, the war and eventually peace in Ukraine. Russia set out to conquer Ukraine in February 2022, betting that the country would quickly collapse. This did not happen, as we know, because of the heroic resistance against their aggression by the Ukrainian people, and more or less because of this heroism, they forced us, or rather, Ukraine forced the West to come to their support. Because if Ukraine had collapsed within a week or two, no support would have been possible. Were the arms transfers and Allied support to Ukraine adequate and timely? I think I should leave this to historians. For the time being, in fact, for several weeks now, Russia has been making progress on the front line, slowly, but apparently not decisively, to really make Ukraine collapse. But Ukraine is suffering dearly by the incessant bombings of its infrastructure. Ukraine is holding firm until now, but its leaders, there are voices from the military, but also many more from civil society, which tell us that even leaders are not ruling out the possibility that sooner or later, at least some sections of the front line could collapse.

And Donald Trump, as we all know, has repeatedly boasted that he could resolve the issue in 24 hours. He has been more cautious since he was elected. He's now talking about a couple of months, but even that is a very ambitious goal. Well, President Zelensky himself, of course, is trying to adapt to this situation. He has adjusted his stance in advance. He is now ready to consider territorial concessions in exchange for NATO membership or equivalent security guarantees. Yesterday he said, well, if not NATO membership, maybe nuclear bombs would be enough for Ukrainian security perception. But we can all, I think, imagine what this could mean. Deep down, I think Ukrainian leaders probably prefer Trump's approach to Biden's approach. With the latter, support was never decisive and mostly not timely. I'm not talking about our home country and other Europeans. This would have created, if Paris had been in the White House now, the prospect of an endless war. So I think at least with Trump in the White House, there is the possibility that the war could end earlier. But the question is how. And with Trump, the risk is there that he agrees to a bad deal just to get over with it, just to fulfill his campaign promise to end the war, like he did with the tariffs with Mexico, Canada, and China. This is postponed for four weeks now. But let's see. And he has already declared victory and said, well, I deliver it.

Challenge number two, the Trump challenge, or should I rather say the Trump-Musk challenge. It's hard to say if that challenge is bigger than the Ukrainian challenge, but both are very closely tied to each other. When Trump's reappearance in the White House has a structuring, or should I rather say a destructuring impact on the entire international scene. For the European Union, the expected shock on the trade front is anticipated. And here I'm sure that the Commission is well prepared to counter this. And well, what China is doing, what Mexico has said in their first response, and also to note from Canada, we are much more serious about the economic, on the trade bloc than the Canadians and the Mexicans.

But what about the other issues? Trump has demanded 5% of GDP into defense. Well, Rutte, our new Secretary General of NATO, is already talking about 3%, 3.5%. Even Robert Habeck of the Greens, the chancellor candidate, is talking about 3.5%. Who had expected that from the Greens? But it's necessary. And Rutte even talked about the possibility of war. So we really have to think about this. And I think our still defense minister was very much slapped in the face by his own party when he talked about the Bundeswehr having to become Kriegs-tauglich. But that's right. What do you need an army for if it's not Kriegs-tauglich? You cannot fight. So the army has to be able to fight. That's definitely clear. So there's a consensus. Europe has to do much more on defense. But it's not just that.

There are other suggestions by Trump which are even more disturbing. He's talked about claiming Greenland, about the annexation of Canada and the Panama Canal. Well, we have seen this is not just talk. Rubio, the foreign minister, was sent to Panama. The Panamanians had to at least tell them, well, we will restrict the Chinese influence. That was the minimum. But they had to say, to signal that they are willing to talk. His business partner, the world's richest man, Elon Musk, he has friended the British prime minister. He flirts with the AfD in Germany and other right-wing parties. He's just dissolved USAID, which is a huge blow to many countries on the globe. And USAID has a six-time bigger budget—or had, I should say—than Germany, for example. So it's no way that Europe can replace this. And we have not just Syria and Gaza to rebuild. We have a big, forgotten civil war in Sudan, with over 100,000 people being killed there, totally destroyed in many parts of the country. So the Americans are definitely needed. And without the Americans, many hundreds of thousands of people will risk simply dying from hunger because USAID is the biggest donor of the World Health Program. So Trump's second term is likely to come as a much bigger shock than the first. And every day, he makes it clearer that he recognizes only China, Russia, and maybe India here and there as peers and not us Europeans. Well, Japan is maybe in a good situation because Shinzo Abe was able to establish a good personal relationship with Trump during the first term. And Trump knows he needs Japan to deal with China. So Japan might be lucky, at least on the political front. But when it comes to tariffs, I'm not so sure that he will also not be a target by Trump on the trade front.

How can European strategy adapt to this challenge, and with what partners? So I come to my third challenge. And this is basically the consequence of challenge number one and number two. And this is basically what our book is about, building a stronger and more resilient Europe. I will be brief in this part. The almost reflexive response to the above question is to prioritize the European project. And there's no doubt the European Union is the first line of defense for all of us, even for the bigger countries, for France, for Germany, for Italy. And without Europe, we are all small. Now that's what — well, Jean-Claude Juncker has said various times that there are two types of countries in the European Union — small countries and countries who haven't realized that they are also small. He was not naming Germany, but of course, he had also Germany in mind.

The European Union itself, but also big member states — France and Germany — are going through a period of significant weakness. Over the last 10 years, European economic weight, once on par with America's, has fallen far behind in cutting-edge technologies that now make up a big difference. Europeans seem unable to compete in the race between the United States and China. We are struck, however, by a certain stagnation in our debate in Europe. We have to boost our economy. We have to become serious on defense cooperation. No doubt about that. Actually, we need closer cooperation between Berlin and Paris, and we have to increase this to Warsaw, to the classical Weimar triangle, which hasn't worked during the Kaczynski times, and now it's not working because Paris and Berlin have not really cooperated well during the last three-plus years. Well, frankly, I expect Germany to play a more active role in the future, and I also think that France and Germany will get closer to each other, and this is actually what other Europeans want.

Challenge number four, the new geopolitical map in the Middle East. Well, we all know October 7, 2023, Israel was shaken by the unexpected and very bloody, ferocious blows by Hamas. Since then, Israel has changed the geopolitical map in the Middle East. It has decimated Hamas, well, at a very high civilian cost, no doubt about that. It has decimated Hezbollah in Lebanon. It has twice bombarded Iran. Iran is now substantially weakened and deprived of a large part of its proxies in the region and itself vulnerable to massive strikes on its nuclear installations because when Israel bombarded Iran, they bombarded in particular the air defense. So Iran is without air defense, and Russia cannot deliver supplies because they need their own air defense because of Ukrainian drone activities against the oil and gas installations. But there are other byproducts of Israel's moves, regime change in Syria, the relative rise of power of Turkey and a significant loss of Russian influence in the region.

Challenge number five, the Global South and the coalition of middle powers. When the Global South is gaining more and more influence, well, the BRICS, everybody knows this term, and the BRICS format has been, or is being taken much more seriously now since Johannesburg, in particular when it became clear that it's attractive for many countries. Not all, Argentina decided not to join. And well, South Africa didn't necessarily want the Nigerians in. So there were even more who wanted to join than actually were taken in for this or for other reasons. But there is also another category within the Global South, besides the BRICS. It's the category of middle powers. Well, there are quite a few of them, from India to Turkey, Brazil to Saudi Arabia, Indonesia to Morocco, and many more. They carry a much bigger economic weight in today's world. And with economic weight comes political weight, political influence; they are not marginal anymore.

We face the strategic threat posed by Russia, the harsh economic and scientific competition by China and the US, and now we have this unpredictable president in the White House. We cannot ignore the growing threats and uncertainties. We cannot ignore the fact that Europe is shrinking in the global balance of power. But there is no alternative for us to fight against defeatism and to defend our interests and values. And two other seemingly contradictory lessons emerge from this above analysis. In a world that has become so complicated, so complex and challenging, it is in the interest of Europe as a whole not only to stay united but to diversify partnerships while at the same time sharpening our focus and better prioritizing our strategic priorities. And that's exactly what our book is about. Thank you!“ [APPLAUSE]